If you have any interest in the naval combat that occured in the Pacific during WWII, then you need to read this book.
It provides an in-depth re-examination of the conflict utilizing sources that have been available in Japan for at least twenty years, but that haven't made it into any English translations until now. The result is that many of the reasons for the Japanese defeat, long regarded as "fact," are now exposed as fiction. Including the ideas that the Japanese carriers were caught with fully armed and fueled planes on their decks that would have launched an attack within five minutes had they not been hit by the Americans, and that Admiral Nagumo could have taken steps to avoid the initial disaster that befell three quarters of his carrier force during those attacks.
The primary sources for this re-examination are the logs of the carrier air groups assigned to the Kido Butai, the Japanese combined fleet. While the logs of the ships themselves no longer exist, the logs of their air groups do, and the authors' examination of those logs go a long ways towards recreating the course of events that led up to the destruction of Japan's premier carriers.
This account is told almost exclusively from the Japanese point of view, referring to US sources only when necessary to fully describe the situation. At the same time, the authors do not allow themselves to fall into the trap of letting this point of view portray the Japanese sailors and airmen in an overly positive light. While the tales of death and suffering that the Japanese sailors suffer should lead to a level of empathy and pity, the authors remind you that many of these same men participated in actions that resulted in atrocities, including the deliberate sinking of ships full of civilian refugees during the battle for Singapore, and the execution of captured American pilots during Midway itself. They don't bludgeon you over the head with this information, but use it to help maintain a level of balance in what is otherwise a story told from largely one perspective.
The main part of the book is divided into three overall sections. The first describes the events leading up to the battle and the plans that were made to fight it, along with pointing out many of the flaws in those plans. Then comes the bulk of the book which consists of a chronological account of the battle itself. This is followed by an analysis of why Japan lost, an assessment of the battle's importance, and a summary of the myths that have surrounded the battle and why they were created.
Also included is an extensive collection of appendices. These include a Japanese OOB, technical details and drawings of the four Japanese carriers and the planes that flew from them, a short analysis of what would have likely happened had the Japanese attempted to land on Midway as planned, an explanation of Japanese aircraft tail codes, a chronology of Japanese fighter operations during the battle, a strike roster of all aircrews involved in the operation and more. Finally, there is also an extensive section of notes, bibliography and index.
Throughout the text are a number of photographs, maps and diagrams that help illustrate the progress of the battle.
As has been said before of the battle: before Midway the Japanese knew only success, after it they knew only defeat. While the authors make a compelling case in their conclusions that this battle should not be considered decisive, it still marked a turning point in the war, whether it actually caused that turning point or not.
Whether you have prior experience in studying the battle of Midway or not, this is an excellent, well-written book that should provide you with new insights into it.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
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